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In a letter dated 12 January 1907, written to the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal, the 
philosopher Edmund Husserl presents a half-formed analogy between the artist and 
the phenomenologist. Husserl writes that both the artist and the phenomenologist, in 
their respective efforts to study the world, share the common attitude of indifference 
regarding the world’s existence; they both experience the world as phenomena. Both 
the aesthetic and phenomenological intuitions, then, are marked by the departure from 
the “natural” attitude,  the everyday ordinary attitude of taking objective reality for 
granted.  Husserl concludes the thought by describing how the philosopher, with his 
observations,  goes  on  to  produce  a  critique  of  reason,  whereas  the  artist  simply 
gathers materials for his art.2 This is where the comparison apparently ends. 
1 This is a revised version of a talk given at British Society of Aesthetics Conference in London, UK, 
September 2010. After presenting this paper, I discovered that Swedish philosopher Sven Olov 
Wallenstein recently translated the 1907 letter into English and also wrote an accompanying text. My 
work differs in that Wallenstein offers merely an exegesis of the analogy, whereas I point toward a kind 
of “metaphysicalization” of art. I would also like to thank Arnd Wedemeyer, Vid Simoniti, and an 
anonymous reader for their helpful criticism and comments.
2 “Sie [Phänomenologie] fordert eine von der ‘natürlichen‘ wesentlich abweichende Stellungnahme 
zu aller Objektivität, die nahe verwandt ist derjenigen Stellung u. Haltung, in die uns Ihre Kunst als 
eine rein ästhetische hinsichtlich der dargestellten Objecte und der ganzen Umwelt versetzt.“ Husserl 
(1994), p. 133. 
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The  import  of  this  passage  has  always  been  understood  in  light  of  its  poet 
recipient,3 and philosophical scholarship thus far appears to downplay the import of 
this passage.4 However, if we follow Husserl’s remark in the letter and presume that 
the  artist,  armed  with  her  special  intuition  that  is  analogous  to  the  singularly 
penetrating intuition of the philosopher, goes on to produce art, then on what grounds 
can we exclude art from getting at the “meaning of the world phenomenon” as much 
as philosophical phenomenology does?5 My proposal here is  to try to complete the 
analogy, to examine the workings of art in terms of Husserl’s philosophy. In doing so, 
I  will  try  to  suggest,  we  can  uncover  important  connections  between  art  and 
phenomenology, and, in turn, begin to see art itself as a project akin to the Husserlian 
conception of philosophy. 
***
Though his main project was the development of phenomenology, Husserl, from early 
on  in  the  process  of  developing  his  phenomenology,  also  often  engaged  with 
aesthetics-related topics. In a lecture series given in the winter semester of 1904/5, in 
which the central question addressed is “Phantasy and Image Consciousness,” we find 
a brief mention of what Husserl calls “aesthetic contemplation.”6 Aesthetics in this 
and other early contexts is misleading for our purposes, for these discussions had little 
to  do with  art  per  se.  Not  surprisingly,  for  our  scientist  of  perception,  “aesthetic 
consciousness” has everything to do with perception; indeed, he defines and continues 
to define it as the awareness of the manner in which something appears.7 However, in 
the same lecture series, Husserl goes on to discuss another term, “phantasy,” 8 a term 
that clarifies the particular fascination the artist holds for the phenomenologist. This 
mode of perception, in the ordinary sense, denotes some kind of mental ability, the 
ability to freely imagine unfettered by parameters of reality—in other words, what we 
might call the power of the imagination.  Although here phantasy is presented in the 
service of the greater discussion on perception, namely phenomenology, this related 
faculty emerges as significant in its own right. Husserl begins by outlining the main 
3 I am indebted to Arnd Wedemeyer for this insight.
4 Cf. Lories (2006) and Dastur (1991). 
5 In the letter, where he makes the analogy, Husserl seems to use the terms ‘phenomenology’ and 
‘philosophy’ interchangeably; he initially uses the term „Phänomenologe“ but in the course of the same 
paragraph, switches to „Philosophen“.
6 Husserl (2005), p. 39.
7 Ibid., pp. 40, 461.
8 The word is Phantasie in German; philosopher John B. Brough, in his English translation, keeps the 
“ph” of the spelling to highlight how this term differs from ordinary fantasy. For this paper, I have 
adopted this orthographical idiosyncrasy.
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features of the ordinary understanding of phantasy, and it is in this discussion that he 
arrives at the figure of the artist. 
What interests us are phenomenological data understood as the foundations of an eidetic 
analysis that we are going to undertake. What interests us here, therefore, are intentional, 
or better, objectivating experiences – so-called “phantasy presentations,” often simply 
termed “presentations,” which we are also in the habit of apprehending under the 
ambiguous title of “phantasy activity”; for example, the experiences in which the artist 
sees his phantasy formations, or more precisely, that peculiar internal seeing itself or 
bringing to intuition of centaurs, heroic characters, landscapes, and so on, which we 
contrast to external seeing, to the external seeing that belongs to perception.9
It is in this ability that Husserl, three years even before his epistolary declaration with 
which  we  began,  already  recognizes  what  sets  the  artist  apart.  He  believes  that 
phantasy is particularly well developed in the artist, or better yet, that it is endemic to 
being an artist that one operates in phantasy.
Resonating with what he later writes to the poet, here Husserl takes the artist and 
her creative experience to exemplify the sort of “phenomenological data understood 
as  the  foundation  of  an  eidetic analysis…”  (my  italics)  of  the  “intentional”  or 
“objectivating” experiences.10 The possibility of understanding phantasy as essentially 
a propaedeutic to phenomenology is secured by Husserl’s reiteration of these ideas in 
his definitive work, the text in which he first properly outlines his phenomenology, 
the Ideas of 1913. Here, he writes, “phantasy… can be so perfectly clear that it makes 
possible a perfect  seizing upon essences and a perfect eidetic insight.”11 Operating 
“eidetically,” this ability to bring something  immanently into view will ease us into 
phenomenological fluency, as it is precisely what gets our mind out of the realm of 
concrete reality and into a realm where factual actuality is immaterial, the realm of 
pure ideation.
Such  a  realm  is  the  domain  of  phenomenology  because  the  bold  project  of 
phenomenology begins its attempt to reexamine and reestablish philosophy by first 
focusing on the  nature  of  perception  and consciousness,  focusing in  particular  on 
“pure” consciousness. This distillation or “purity” is at the heart of phenomenology 
9 Husserl (2005), pp. 2-3.
10  Ibid., p. 2.
11 Husserl (1982), p. 158.
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and  the  phenomenological  method—the  phenomenological  reduction.  To  properly 
capture every nuance of Husserl’s account of this reduction is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but for our purposes, we may focus on two aspects of his discussions: how 
this reduction relates phenomenology to the tradition of transcendental idealism and 
the implications for understanding phenomenology as a new, critical philosophy. This 
will allow us to come back to the question of art and ultimately, in light of the claims 
of  phenomenology,  as  the  analogy  with  which  we  began  suggests,  to  come  to 
understand art as philosophy.
 Phenomenology begins by reformulating and then addressing the epistemological 
problem of  how subjective  psychological  experience  grasps  actuality.  To properly 
examine our experience, Husserl’s suggests that we exclude all that is external to our 
minds and examine cognition itself. The phenomenological reduction is an invitation 
to  suspend our  naïve  belief  in  the  “real”  world,  the  world  around us.  This  is  the 
famous “bracketing” of mundane actuality. This is by no means a denial of the world's 
existence,  but  simply  the  suspension  of  passing  such  judgments.  Thus  Husserl 
discovers what he calls the “intentive” structure of our consciousness: that reality is 
“not  in  itself  something  absolute… it  has  the  essentiality  of  something  which,  of 
necessity, is only intentional, only an object of consciousness.”12 In other words, we 
thusly discover that the world is “for” our consciousness. It is not difficult to see how 
phenomenology relates to the longer tradition of transcendental idealism, the tradition 
that  came  to  understand  the  perceiving  subject  as  the  world-constituting  subject. 
However,  what is also at  stake in Husserl’s project  is the connection between the 
realm of ideas and the real, actual world outside of the subject.
This notion of world-constitution is vital to Husserl’s project but also complicates 
phenomenology’s reception. For him, phenomenology is only misunderstood if it is 
taken to be dealing purely with consciousness in the sense of immaterial  idealism. 
However,  trying  to  follow  Husserl’s  adamant  claims,  that  his  transcendental 
philosophy is not merely another idealism, leads to a paradox, as one of his students 
and later collaborator, Eugen Fink noticed: how can the empirical ego be, also at once, 
transcendental? To rephrase in perhaps more quotidian terms: how can someone be 
simultaneously an empirical, flesh and blood, subject while also being a subject in an 
immaterial sense, the transcendental subject, who “makes” the world possible at all, a 
world that  “is” only for that  transcendental  subject? Indeed the very fact  that  this 
12 Ibid., p. 113.
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paradox eludes satisfactory transcription is testament, in part, of the paradox itself as 
well as the difficulty Husserl faces, defending his phenomenology against accusations 
of idealism. 
I  mentioned earlier  that  we couldconsider  phenomenology as  a  kind of  critical 
philosophy and this could help us bring these problems further down to earth. By this 
I  want  to  suggest  that  we  pull  phenomenology  further  away  from the  pitfalls  of 
idealism, that we understand the phenomenological reduction as simply outlining a 
method for how we become critical about our everyday experiences. At the risk of 
diminishing  the  depth  and  breadth  intended  by  Husserl  when  he  developed  his 
phenomenology,  I  am  humbly  suggesting  that  the  “reduction”  could  perhaps  be 
understood as a very trenchant “aha” moment. This is one way of making sense of the 
paradox Fink illustrates.
Husserl himself, toward the end of his 1913 Ideas, briefly mentions what he calls 
the “transcendental clue,”13 a notion that he develops further in later texts, particularly 
in his drafts for the encyclopedia Britannica entry on “Phenomenology” which he was 
asked to write in the late 1920s. He suggests that phenomenology begins, as it were, 
by one becoming aware of the transcendental  problem, i.e.  the problem of world-
constitution.  In light  of this  suggestion,  the suggestion I  am putting forth  in what 
follows is to understand art as a, if not the, transcendental clue—the thing that jars our 
naïve natural mode and propels us into a phenomenological mode in which we realize 
that we are, while also being empirical subjects made of flesh and blood in a material 
world, transcendental subjects. In other words, experiencing art is a mode in which we 
achieve a profoundly critical view of our being in and experience of the world.
***
Here is one way to think about the connections between art and phenomenology. The 
kind of reflective mode that is at  the heart  of phenomenology,  at  the heart  of the 
phenomenological reduction, shares a consequential correspondence with the kind of 
reflection  generated  in  an  aesthetic  encounter.  An  artwork  presents  a  particularly 
puzzling encounter. Husserl does address the apparent complexity of the perceptual 
exprerience in relation to representational art. He defines, for instance, what he calls 
the  “image”  consciousness  (Bildbewusstsein)  in  this  way:  in  the  case  of  a 
representational work of art—Husserl takes the specific example of paintings—there 
appear to be many subjects, or at least what the subject is, is complicated. What we 
13 Ibid., §150
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perceive, according to Husserl, is a complex involving as many as three objects: the 
physical image (the physical thing made of canvas, paint, etc.); the representing or 
depicting object (e.g. the image-of a vase with sunflowers); the presented or depicted 
object (e.g. the “actual” vase full of sunflowers).14 Clearly this is touching on issues of 
the complexity of an art object as compared with a straightforward everyday object. 
Of  course,  as  the  name  suggests,  Husserl’s  image  consciousness  has  to  do, 
specifically, with how we perceive representational works of art. The discussion here 
is unrelated to the transcendental problem. However, Husserl is sensitive to the fact 
that there is something peculiar about art, even at this local level of representational 
art. Even in a diametrically opposite case, in the case of abstract painting, there is an 
intricate  splitting  of  perceptual  fields.  There  is  a  tension  between  the  prominent 
material presence of the work and the perplexing “abstraction.” And one could say it 
is precisely this tension that makes the work thought provoking. However, as I will 
argue,  it  is  not  this  ostensible perceptual  puzzle  that  makes  art  in  general  so 
interesting, indeed critical, to phenomenology.
The radical wager contained in phenomenology is the notion of the transcendental 
sphere, specifically the notion that it is concealed within the empirical sphere. Husserl 
himself addresses the ostensible paradoxes and complications inherent to suggesting 
that there is this transcendental sphere, and as we have seen, his student Fink, further 
develops  these  concerns  by  specifically  engaging  with  the  problem  of  how  the 
empirical  ego  can  be at  once also transcendental.  Fink takes  Husserl’s  discussion 
further:  while  Husserl  mentions  simply that  there  are  “motivations”  that  impel  an 
investigation  toward  the  ultimate  encounter  with  the  transcendental  sphere,  Fink 
makes the stronger claim that there are moments in which the transcendental sphere 
“flashes out.” 15 It seems, then, that we can understand phenomenology and art to both 
provide this rupture-like experience,  a shift or displacement (Versetzung) from our 
everyday.
If we return to Husserl’s privileging of the artist, we could argue that an art object, 
precisely by forcing us into its fictional, “phantasy,” world, forces our cognition to 
become aware of itself in a critical way. In a text from 1918, Husserl writes, “art is the 
realm of phantasy that has been given form…”16 and later, in one of the drafts for the 
aforementioned encyclopedia entry, Husserl goes so far as to say, through phantasy, 
14 Husserl (2005), p. 21.
15 Fink and Husserl (1995), p. 34.
16 Husserl (2005), p. 616.
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we are made aware of the fact that we are the constituting subjects of various worlds.17 
Although the discussion here deals with the making of art and we are now interested 
in the reception of art, I believe that we can take Husserl’s word and suggest a way in 
which even the non-artist, by way of being a phenomenologist or at least perceiving 
with phenomenological sensitivity perceives something as art (as kind of making of 
art, via how one perceives). This kind of perceptual appropriation suggests a way of 
completing Husserl’s half-formed analogy. A brief thought experiment illustrates how 
this may occur. 
Our case involves  a  kind of  “found art,”  which is  admittedly a limit  case,  but 
therefore  all  the  more  receptive  to  the  possibility  of  very  ordinary  moments 
demonstrating some kind of phenomenological sensitivity.  We are walking down a 
path,  say,  at  a  university  campus  and  encounter  a  pile  of  wood.  In  ordinary 
circumstances, this pile of wood might have been placed here for a number of reasons: 
a storm, a gardener, a person who got bored, a old tree that fell and broke in a certain 
arrangement,  etc.  Also,  normally,  one  would  overlook  this  pile  of  wood  and 
concentrate on staying on the path to whatever destination, or perhaps attend to untied 
shoelaces,  or  some  other  mundane  activity.  In  contradistinction  to  this  quotidian 
attitude, there might be an occasion in which this pile of wood suddenly becomes the 
focus of one’s attention precisely because there is something peculiar about it. One 
may even jokingly say, look at this “art.” Now, what is meant by this utterance? We 
can think of similar examples besides a pile of wood—it could have been a crushed 
can of soda, a new can, or bits of concrete. Even in this jocular mode, what is intended 
by this utterance is precisely that there is something peculiar or eye-catching about the 
arrangement. Certainly the history of aesthetics has much to say about this, but we are 
interested in the kind of perceptual event or experience that this utterance marks. It is 
as though one is  jolted into focusing on the appearance of the wood—this would 
precisely  be  what  Husserl  calls  the  “aesthetic  consciousness.”  But  this  particular 
attentiveness,  we  want  to  argue,  is  more  than  a  mere  sensitivity  to  the  mode  of 
appearance. Rather it seems that something like the constitution, in the transcendental 
sense,  of the world flashes out.  In noticing the pile of wood, suddenly something 
fundamental about it comes to the fore—the possibility of wondering how we came to 
cognize in the way that we did.
17 Husserl (1997), p. 169.
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This example, though only a sketch, can help us to constellate the three points that 
can allow us to complete Husserl’s half-explained analogy of phenomenology and art
—imagination, eidetics, and transcendentality. The pile of wood, as we have admitted, 
is a limit case; it was chosen in order to show that even this extremely mundane object 
(arguably “found art”) contains the power to ignite our imagination. We have seen the 
immense importance of the imagination for Husserl’s phenomenology, but also via 
eidetics—the  realm  of  pure  cognition—to  the  later  discussed  transcendentalism. 
Realizing that we can be the variable subjects of every imaginary world we create, we 
are already given a glimpse of transcendental world-constitution. The pile of wood in 
being perceived by us as “art” has drawn us into its fiction and we now live, even for 
a moment, in its imagined world. This might be a stretch but, along these lines, we 
could also say that in deeming something an art object (whether on the part of the 
artist  during  the  process  of  creation  or  the  viewer  in  the  encounter),  an  essential 
critique of cognition is already in play. And because the existential parameters of the 
“real” world become irrelevant, one is operating with pure consciousness.
In trying to “understand” art, as some would say, we are essentially involved in a 
critique  of  our  perceptual  experience,  precisely  due  to  the  nature  of  an  aesthetic 
encounter. Due to this encounter, we begin to wonder, how is it that we see such and 
such feature or dab of color? Art may mirror or mock life, but above all it makes us 
question life. It pushes us out of the natural attitude. The encounter with the pile of 
wood  may  intensify  our  curiosity  about  the  constitution  of  the  wood,  the  path—
simply by providing a perceptual rupture, and momentarily rendering the actual world 
uncertain and irrelevant, the possibility of questioning life emerges. At last, we can 
properly  suggest  that  art  be  understood  as  Husserl’s  transcendental  “clue.”  The 
motivation toward the transcendental is hinted at within the empirical sphere. 
This correlation between art and phenomenology, for which I have been arguing, 
has a twofold effect. It sketches the beginnings of a complex account of the role of 
fiction,  imagination  and  free  phantasy.  And  this  in  turn,  as  I  have  emphasized, 
facilitates entry into the phenomenological mode. Now we can ask, what does this 
properly suggest about the status of phenomenology, as a critique of cognition it first 
set out to be? Given the kind of investigation phenomenology is, it makes sense that 
something like the imagination should be emphasized. It is an invitation to untangle 
critical thinking from empirical reality precisely in order to facilitate turning its regard 
toward the fundamental issue of how there is this reality at all. The turning of the 
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regard toward mental acts cannot itself be a mental act of the same genus precisely if 
it is to be a phenomenological regard. Everything is put on hold except for that seeing 
itself—precisely what Husserl means by the empty looking (of the empty Ego). What 
comes into focus is the pure cognition. And we have come to understand this “purity” 
to mean a pure ideation, precisely due to Husserl’s emphasis on the importance of 
imagination. 
We can now appreciate Husserl’s claim that the transcendental problem of world-
constitution is already available to us even in our pre-phenomenological state, because 
we  are  coming  close  to  it  whenever  we  create  imaginary  worlds  and  recognize 
ourselves as the constituting subjects of these worlds.18 Husserl, by privileging art in 
the way that  he does in his letter,  not only highlights phenomenology’s  particular 
relationship to reality, which is arguably his main concern, but also suggests a way in 
which the kinks of phenomenology might be resolved from without, from art. Art is 
an investigation in its own right and not in competition with philosophy, of world-
constitution.
***
Phenomenology presents a convincing case that the world is truly more than meets the 
eye. Although it begins as a means of first properly reformulating and then addressing 
the  epistemological  problem  of  how  subjective  psychological  experience  grasps 
actuality,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  how  the  examination  of  such  a  question  has 
implications  reaching  beyond  the  domain  solely  of  the  theory  of  knowledge. 
Cognition is the fundamental pathway between oneself and the world. The concern, 
then, with the nature of cognition can easily grow into the farther-reaching concern 
about  the  condition  of  the  world,  of  one’s  being  in  the  world,  and  so  on.  The 
particular  urgency,  then,  of  proposing  a  method  or  philosophical  practice  such as 
phenomenology is emphasized from its earliest presentations.
The radical claim of Husserl’s phenomenology is that “the” world not only “is” for 
the subject, as has been argued by the tradition of transcendental idealism—the world 
“is” in a distinctly non-idealist sense while also being something other than a purely 
spatio-temporally extensive world. Husserl wants to claim that the sense of the world 
is given to us by our own consciousness. However, because phenomenology takes as 
its  basis  pure  consciousness,  it  “necessarily  arrives  at  this  entire  complex  of 
18 Elliott (2004) is an excellent resource for more extensive discussions on the role of the imagination 
in phenomenology.
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transcendental problems in the specific sense, and on that account deserves the name 
of transcendental phenomenology.”19 The transcendental issue is to make intelligible 
the correlation between constituting subjectivity and constituted objectivity. As such, 
phenomenology makes the task for itself of rethinking philosophy itself. The natural 
world was never annihilated in the phenomenological process, indeed, what it is, was 
given a deeper sense. Its substance was substantiated. The world is not an idea in our 
heads,  and  the  encounter  with  art  grounds  our  imagination  in  the  critical  sense, 
revealing itself as a transcendental clue.
Through pursuing the connection between phenomenology and aesthetics, it seems 
we have uncovered an important motivation for considering the art of philosophy, and 
in turn, art as philosophy.
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